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Introduction to the Modern Orthodox Tradition 
PAUL VALLIERE 
In her study of the Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire, Joan 
Hussey begins with a caveat: "In the present state of our knowledge a book 
on the Byzantine Church must necessarily be in the nature of an interim 
report since much pioneer work remains to be done."] The same must be 
said about the attempt to present the "teachings" of modern Orthodoxy 
concerning law, society, and politics. While the historical sources for the 
study of modern Orthodox social ethics stand closer to us in time than 
those on which Byzantinists must rely, our level of knowledge about the 
subject is not markedly higher. 
TI1ere are at least two reasons for this. The first is the catastrophe of 
the Russian Revolution (1917), which ruined the largest, richest, and 
best-educated Orthodox church in the world. The destruction wrought 
by Communism in Russia and elsewhere made civilized discourse on 
church and society in the Orthodox East extremely difficult for most of 
the twentieth century. The second is misleading stereotypes of Ortho­
doxy. TI1e perception of Orthodoxy in the West has been deeply affected 
by a Christian "orientalism" that alternates between a condescending, 
essentially imperialist view of Orthodoxy as a backward form of Christi­
anity and a romantic view of it as preserving mystical values from which 
a putatively rationalistic Western Christianity has fallen away.1 Both 
stereotypes, though opposed, promote the notion that Orthodox theol­
ogy is not fundamentally concerned with law, society, and politics. In 
fact, Orthodoxy has been wrestling with issues of modern legal, politi­
cal, and social order for almost three hundred years, and a large body of 
primary source material for the study of the subject is at hand, albeit 
underexplored. 
Orthodoxy's meeting with modernity began in Russia during the reign 
of Peter the Great (1682-1725), and by the late eighteenth century this 
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encounter was having a significant impact throughout the Orthodox 
world. In the nineteenth century, as Russia emerged as one of the most dy­
namic cultural centers of world civilization and as smaller Orthodox na­
tions won their independence from the Ottoman Empire, a broad 
modern-style discourse about church and society was cultivated through 
a number of channels: new educational institutions, arts and letters, secu­
lar and theological journalism, scholarship, politics, secular and ecclesias­
tical courts, and other venues. In short, there is a historical record-the 
annals of what might be called the Orthodox Enlightenment-against 
which to check our generalizations about the teachings of modern Ortho­
doxy on law, society, and politics. Because this record has been so little in­
vestigated, however, checking it is an arduous procedure. Hence the caveat 
about an "interim report." 
In the following pages, the views of five modern Orthodox thinkers on 
issues of law, society, and politics are presented-Vladimir Soloviev, 
Nicholas Berdyaev, Vladimir Lossky, Mother Maria Skobtsova, and Du­
mitru Staniloae. It cannot be stressed strongly enough that all five of 
these thinkers were modern; that is to say, they wrestled with the situa­
tion of Orthodoxy in the expansive global civilization produced by the 
scientific and political revolutions of the Enlightenment. As Orthodox 
thinkers, all five also drew on patristic sources, that is to say, the writings 
of the church fathers. 3 However, it is not always possible to make a neat 
distinction between patristic and modern elements in their thought. TIle 
patristic corpus is variegated. Interpreters find different elements of sig­
nificance in it, depending on the issues they wish to pursue. TIlere is no 
reason to suppose that all elements drawn from the patristic tradition by 
modern Orthodox thinkers will be consistent with each other. On the 
contrary, one should expect to find differences of opinion, tensions, even 
contradictions. 
Modern historical scholarship on patristics is another variable. To their 
credit, modern Orthodox thinkers have always paid close attention to his­
torical research on the ancient and medieval church. Some, such as Vladi­
mir Lossky, were patristic or medieval scholars in their own right. Like all 
scholarly disciplines, however, patristics evolves. New facts are discov­
ered, new hypotheses are introduced, old views are revised. As a result, 
the scholarly consensus keeps shifting. What is deemed patristic at one 
point in time might be viewed otherwise at a later time; and of course the 
later view, too, is susceptible to revision. TIlis is a perfectly natural state of 
affairs, but it is often forgotten by theologians who accuse their predeces­
sors of betraying the church fathers without taking into account what the 
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scholarship of an earlier day had to say about those same fathers. In short, 
the patristic connection in modern Orthodox theology is itself a modern, 
not just a traditional, factor; it is a complicating, not just a clarifying, 
factor. 
This point bears directly on the relations between the thinkers pre­
sented in this volume. Their collective labors span about a century­
from Vladimir Soloviev's first book (The Crisis of Western Philosophy, 
1874) to Dumitru SUiniloae's magnum opus (Orthodox Dogmatic Theol­
ogy, 1978). The most important historical event affecting Orthodox the­
ology in this period was the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its long, sad 
aftermath. The most significant theological shift occurred a bit later, 
however, with the rise of the neopatristic theology of Father Georges 
Florovsky and Vladimir Lossky. The key books signaling the neopatristic 
turn were Florovsky's The Paths ofRussian Theology, published in Rus­
sian in 1937, and Lossky's The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 
published in French in 1944.4 Florovsky and Lossky sharply rejected the 
religious-philosophical approach to theology practiced by Soloviev and 
those whom he inspired, such as Nicholas Berdyaev, Sergei Bulgakov, 
Pavel Florensky, and Lev Karsavin. As Florovsky and Lossky saw it, Solo­
viev and his heirs were bad expositors of the mind of Orthodoxy because 
of the heavy dose of nineteenth-century German idealism and other 
modern tendencies in their thought. The antidote was to return to the 
church fathers, hence the name neopatristic. By the middle of the twen­
tieth century, Florovsky and Lossky's approach had won the day, and it 
has dominated the Orthodox theological scene ever since. Its long life is 
due in no small measure to a brilliant second generation, such as Father 
John Meyendorff and Bishop Kallistos Ware, who quietly set aside the 
polemical spirit of the founders and developed the positive features of 
the neopatristic approach. 
When reading the neopatristic theologians, however, one should not 
accept their initial assumption at face value-namely, that they returned 
to the church fathers while their rivals served other masters. To take this 
view is to ignore the fact that the fathers are not monolithic. Vladimir So­
loviev was well versed in patristics as it was practiced in his time. Sergei 
Bulgakov was even better schooled, thanks to advances in the discipline 
that he followed carefully. The fact that neither Soloviev nor Bulgakov 
viewed the fathers in neopatristic terms does not mean that they failed to 
take the patristic heritage seriously, as their neopatristic critics subse­
quently alleged. It is true that Soloviev and Bulgakov were subject also to 
other intellectual and spiritual influences, but so were the neopatristic 
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theologians. Neopatristic theology was not a unique or isolated phenome­
non in modern theology. It was the Orthodox manifestation of the pan­
European, pan-confessional rebellion against liberalism and modernism 
that reshaped the theological scene following World War 1. It is no acci­
dent that Roman Catholic neo-Thomism, Protestant neo-orthodoxy, and 
Orthodox neopatristic theology bear similar names. The three streams 
had much in common, and mutual influences abounded. Secular influ­
ences, such as existentialism and cultural pessimism, also had an impact 
on all three. 
An area of concern which neopatristic theology did not share with the 
other movements in twentieth-century theology is the one with which 
this volume is chiefly concerned, namely, law, society, and politics. Neo­
Thomism, with which most modern Roman Catholic thinkers were con­
nected in one way or another, is inconceivable without its legal, social, 
and political agenda. Protestant neo-orthodoxy, however we understand 
its original motivation, inspired the ethical and political genius of Diet­
rich Bonhoeffer. Its American counterpart produced Reinhold Niebuhr. 
The Orthodox neopatristic movement, by contrast, did not inspire much 
work on law, society, or politics.s Some would explain this apparent 
anomaly by observing that the construction of ethical systems reflects 
the West's "scholastic" approach to theology, that is, the interpretation 
and application of mysteries of faith by means of discursive reasoning. 
The procedure is supposedly alien to Orthodoxy, which prefers to set the­
ology in a liturgical and mystical context. Orthodox theologians, so the 
argument goes, do not seek general principles but focus on personal 
experience.6 
Whatever the merits of this explanation, it must be qualified in at least 
two respects. First, it is not true that Orthodox thinkers have always 
steered clear of systematic reflection on law, politics, and human nature. 
Many modern Orthodox thinkers, including (in this volume) Vladimir 
Soloviev and Nicholas Berdyaev, have engaged in just such a project. To 
assume that this separates them from "genuine" Orthodox theology is to 
grant the neopatristic case without investigating it. Presumably it is better 
to examine what Soloviev and Berdyaev actually had to say before passing 
judgment on them. 
Second, one must not fail to connect the neopatristic movement with 
the peculiar circumstances produced by the devastation of the Ortho­
dox world in the twentieth century. Neither neo-Thomism nor Protes­
tant neo-orthodoxy developed in exile or in emigration. Both were 
products of a well-patronized theological establishment. Even the mar-
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tyred Dietrich Bonhoeffer was no exception: he ended his career in the 
catacombs, but he certainly did not begin it there. Orthodox theolo­
gians, after the Russian Revolution in 1917, and again after World War II 
ended in 1945, found themselves in a completely different situation. Al­
most all of the social and institutional networks for the support of theol­
ogy in the historic Orthodox lands lay in ruins. Orthodox theology was 
cultivated for the most part in small communities of emigres and West­
ern converts without access to a large natu ral audience. Except in Greece, 
Orthodox theologians worked in contexts where they had virtually no 
access to social or political power and bore no responsibility for its man­
agement. It is no wonder that they regarded theological reflection on 
law, society, and politics to be disconnected from reality-scholastic in 
the pejorative sense. 
Neopatristic writers occasionaHy did concede that the legal, social, and 
political dimensions of human life can be theologized. Bishop KaIIistos 
Ware, for example, pointed to the implications of trinitarian dogma for 
social philosophy: 
The doctrine of the Trinity is not merely a theme for abstract speculation by 
specialists; it has practical and indeed revolutionary consequences for our 
understanding of human personhood and society. The human person is 
made in the image ofGod, that is to say, of God the Trinity, and the doctrine 
of the Trinity affirms that God is not just a monad, the One Joving himself, 
but a triad of divine persons loving each other. Formed in the trinitarian im­
age, the human person is thus created for relationship, sharing, and reci­
procity. Cut oft' from others, isolated, unloving and unloved, no one is a true 
person, but only a bare individual. Our human vocation is therefore to re­
produce on earth at every leveL in the church and in society, the movement 
of mutual love that exists from all eternity within God the Trinity. In the 
words of the Russian thinker Nikolai Fedorov (c. 1828-1903), "Our social 
program is the dogma of the Trinity."7 
Clearly this is an insight that could inspire a major work on Christian 
law, society, and politics. Indeed, it has done so-in Leonardo Boff's Trin­
ity and Society.s Yet one looks in vain for a neopatristic Orthodox contri­
bution to match that of this Brazilian Catholic liberation theologian.9 It is 
telling that the arresting summation of Bishop Kallistos's case-"our so­
cial program is the doctrine of the Trinity"-is taken from Fedorov, one of 
the Russian religious philosophers whom the first generation of neopatris­
tic theologians excoriated as misguided modernists. 
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PHILOKALIA AND PHILOSOPHY 
Two streams of thought have been especially important in shaping the 
discourse about human nature and human destiny in modern Orthodoxy. 
They may be called the philokalic and the philosophic. The first, issuing 
from a revival of contemplative monasticism, reenergized and popular­
ized the patristic concept of theosis (deification). The second took shape in 
nineteenth-century Russian philosophy. Its guiding ideas were wholeness 
and sobornost (fellowship, togetherness, spiritual unity). 
After declining in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Orthodox 
contemplative monasticism began to revive in the later eighteenth cen­
tury. The vehicle of the revival was an anthology of patristic and medieval 
mystical-ascetical texts known as the Philokalia. The pioneers in the dis­
semination of this material were the Greek monks Makarios of Corinth 
and Nikodemos of the Holy Mountain, whose Philokalia was published in 
Venice in 1782, and the Russian monk Paisy Velichkovsky, who directed a 
Slavonic edition at about the same time. In the nineteenth century, Rus­
sian and other vernacular translations began to be made. lO 
The spiritual practices associated with the Philokalia are usually called 
hesychasm, from the Greek word hesychia, meaning quietness. These prac­
tices include quiet sitting, contemplative prayer, and the Jesus Prayer. The 
last consists of the words "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me 
a sinner," repeated as a mantra in fulfillment of the Apostle Paul's counsel 
to "pray without ceasing" (1 Thess. 5: d. These practices were traditionally 
cultivated by a monastic elite. With the wider vernacular dissemination of 
philokalic literature in modern times, a certain democratization of he­
sychasm occurred as laypeople, including some intellectuals. began assimi­
lating the material and applying it in new ways. The prestige of monks as 
confessors and spiritual directors, a relationship that could be conducted by 
correspondence as well as in person, also widened the appreciation for he­
sychasm. Dostoevsky's celebrated portrait of Russian monasticism in The 
Brothers Karamazov (1878-80), based on the author's pilgrimage to Optina 
Hermitage, a center of the hesychast revival in Russia, is an early example of 
this democratization. 
The aspiration of hesychast piety is theosis (deification), an idea con­
taining both an anthropological and an eschatological dimension. An­
thropologically, theosis is related to Orthodoxy's traditionally strong 
affirmation of the enduring, substantial reality of the image of God in hu­
man beings. Unlike Catholic theology, which came to distinguish sharply 
between nature and grace, Orthodox theology prefers to see nature and 
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grace as forever connected because created nature is always and every­
where dependent on the power of GOd.11 Even in their fallen state, humans 
possess a divine beauty because their very being is irradiated by the ener­
gies (grace) of God. Human beings are potentially "gods." The realization 
of this potential is eschatological. In Orthodoxy, however, eschatological 
does not mean "far off." Orthodoxy inclines to a realized eschatology; that 
is to say, it proclaims the kingdom of God as something that can be seen 
and experienced already. Many features of Orthodox practice reinforce 
this view, such as the all-engulfing sacramentalism of the liturgy, the 
icons that mystically host the glorified beings who already live in the king­
dom, and the veneration of the saints. Realized eschatology means that 
theosis has already begun and that its effects can be perceived and assimi­
lated in a holy life. 
The idiom of theosis sometim~s strikes Western Christians as an invita­
tion to idolatry. In fact, it is a Greek way of stating a truth about eternal life: 
since only God is eternal, all who are granted eternal life must in some way 
partake of the divine life. Eternalization implies deification. That there is a 
danger of idolatrous misunderstanding here has always been clear to Or­
thodox theologians, who guard against it by distinguishing between the 
"essence" and the "energies" of God. Not even the saints in glory partake of 
the essence of God; they are eternalized by the divine energies, God's gra­
cious, indwelling, transfiguring presence in them. These energies are fully 
divine, however, not an intermediate, subdivine reality (which, ifit existed, 
would indeed be the stuff of idolatry). 
Theosis may also be understood as a way of speaking about sanctifica­
tion, the being-made-holy of the redeemed. This interpretation makes 
the concept relatively easy for Roman Catholics to appreciate, since Ro­
man Catholics, like Orthodox, have an optimistic view of the possibilities 
of growth in holiness, a view warranting the canonization and veneration 
of saints. Protestants have greater difficulty with the concept because of 
their ambivalence about sanctification as such. Protestantism sees the 
essence of the gospel as consisting in God's gracious, unprompted justifi­
cation of the sinner. The issue of whether and to what extent justified sin­
ners can achieve personal holiness has been a divisive issue for Protestants 
ever since the Sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation. Martin Luther 
and many after him held that justified sinners are holy only by imputa­
tion: God in his mercy chooses to regard the justified as holy by imputing 
to them the holiness of Christ, which they themselves cannot approxi­
mate, much less achieve. Ulrich Zwingli and John Calvin believed that 
justified sinners are regenerated in a more concrete way, being empow­
ered by God's grace to live a holier life than the unredeemed. Because the 
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template of a righteous and holy life is found in the divine law revealed in 
scripture, these theologians sometimes referred to the cultivation of holi­
ness as "the third use of the law."12 While such a pointed appeal to law in 
the context of sanctification would strike Orthodox as strange and some­
how unevangelical, one may nevertheless draw an analogy between the 
third use of the law and monasticism. The zealous pursuit of theosis in 
Orthodoxy has always been closely connected with the asceticallife. In 
modern times this connection has been loosened a bit by the democrati­
zation of piety mentioned above, but traditionally the pursuit of theosis 
was a project that belonged to contemplative monks. To the extent that 
monasticism involves a structured, closely regulated lifestyle constituting 
a kind of polity or "republic" of its own, its connection with theosis is in 
some ways comparable to the third use of the law. 
The primary social and political legacy of hesychasm has been quiet­
ism, as the name suggests. In cases where the threshold of political 
advocacy was crossed, the results were usually conservative, ranging 
from conventional acceptance of the status quo to reactionary forms of 
expression. For more constructive approaches to Christian legal, social, 
and political thought, one must turn to philosophic Orthodoxy. 
Modern Orthodox religious philosophy emerged in Russia in the sec­
ond quarter of the nineteenth century. It began as an effort to make sense 
of Russia's anomalous status in Europe after the end of the Napoleonic 
wars. Militarily, Russia had become one of the arbiters of European des­
tiny. Yet Russia was not European in the sense that its Western neighbors 
were. Russia's political tradition (autocracy), socioeconomic system (peas­
ant communalism), and religious affiliation (Orthodoxy) set it apart from 
the West. In the 1820S and 1830S, Russian intellectuals began a debate 
about Russia's destiny that would last until the revolution. What was Rus­
sia called to be and to do in the modern world? The answers turned largely 
on the assessment of Russia's Eastern Christian heritage. Those who la­
mented Russia's affiliation with "miserable, despised Byzantium" (as Pyotr 
Yakovlevich Chaadaev put it) imagined a future in which Russia would 
be fully integrated into Western European civilization. They were called 
Westernizers. Those who preached loyalty to Russian tradition, opining 
that Orthodoxy held the solution to the problems of modernity, were 
called Slavophiles. 
The most important thinkers of the first generation of Slavophiles were 
Ivan Kireevsky (1806-56) and Aleksei Khomiakov (1804-60).13 Both were 
well acquainted with Western thought. They had studied in Germany and 
were indebted in particular to the German Romantic tradition, especially 
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the philosophy of Friedrich W. J. Schelling. Like their Romantic mentors, 
the Slavophiles rejected the materialism, liberalism, and egoistic individ­
ualism of the Enlightenment. They believed that such trends, if left un­
checked, would cause people to devour each other just as the leaders of 
French Revolution had devoured each other. The alternative to this evil 
prospect lay in rediscovering the wholeness of life, the reality of spiritual 
things, and the ethics of Christian love. Kireevsky elaborated a philoso­
phy of "wholeness" embracing both reason and faith, with faith leading 
reason to the experience of God. Khomiakov elaborated a social philoso­
phy based on Christian love, the socio-ethical counterpart to the whole­
ness cultivated by Kireevsky in the noetic sphere. His model for the good 
society was the lOVing communion of the church at prayer, a fellowship 
uniting each with all and all with God. The neologism sobornost was 
subsequently devised to express this vision in a resonant wordY Both 
Kireevsky and Khomiakov contrasted external or political freedom with 
inner or spiritual freedom: spiritual freedom opens people to fellowship 
with their neighbors and with God; liberal individualism isolates people 
and enslaves them to selfish passions. 
The political legacy of the early Slavophiles was conservative without 
being reactionary. In fact, Slavophilism had reformist implications to 
the extent that its vision of what an ideal Orthodox society should look 
like was obviously at odds with the Russia that actually existed in their 
day. This dissonance did not escape the notice of the censors, who pre­
vented the publication of most of Kireevsky and Khomiakov's writings 
during their lifetime. It would be wrong to cast the Slavophiles as d issi­
dents, however. 1heir discontent did not impel them to political activ­
ism, which they distrusted. Nor did they look to law as a means of 
solving social and political problems. On the contrary, they viewed "ju­
ridicalism" as the quintessential expression of Western rationalism, the 
very opposite of sobornost. Slavophile antilegalism, inspired as much by 
Western Romantic philosophers as by evangelical conscience, contrib­
uted to what has been called "the tradition of the censure of law" in Rus­
sia.15 The antilegalism of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is a more recent 
example of the same phenomenon. 16 
In the next generation the Slavophile tradition grew more complicated. 
The towering figure of Russian religious philosophy, Vladimir Soloviev 
(1853-1900), had one foot in the Slavophile tradition. His philosophy of 
"integral knowledge" picked up where Kireevsky's had left off, and his 
Christian social philosophy developed some of Khomiakov's insights. But 
Soloviev was also interested in the reconciliation of Orthodoxy with 
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European liberalism, a project that led him far from the Slavophile path. 
Soloviev's philosophy inspired the flowering of interest in religion among 
Russian intellectuals at the turn of the twentieth century and contrib­
uted to the emergence of an indigenous Russian liberalismY 
Later Slavophiles became increasingly nationalistic. Slavophilism en­
couraged the development of Russian nationalism to the extent that it cel­
ebrated the differences between Russia and Europe. For Kireevsky and 
Khomiakov, the affirmation of difference was not an end in itself but a 
means of promoting the universal Christian faith, which according to 
them was better preserved in Orthodoxy than in Catholicism or Protes­
tantism. For many nationalists, by contrast, difference was the end, and 
Orthodoxy was a means of promoting it. 
The philokalic and philosophic streams of modern Orthodox thought 
were not completely isolated from each other. Beginning with Kireevsky, 
religious philosophers took an interest in philokalic sources. Conversely, 
the appropriation of philokalic values by artists and intellectuals always 
involved some sort of philosophical mediation. Dostoevsky's pilgrimage 
to Optina Hermitage in the company of the philosopher Vladimir Solo­
viev is the perfect symbol of such mediation. 
Scholarly studies of hesychasm in the twenti~th century, of which 
John Meyendorff's A Study of Gregory Palamas (1959) was the most 
influential, furthered the democratization of hesychast spirituality and 
made an important contribution to neopatristic theology in particu­
lar. l8 The philosophical mediation of hesychasm, while much less prom­
inent than historical-theological appropriations of the subject, also 
continues.19 
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE ORTHODOX TRADITION 
For a long time, Western scholars persisted in characterizing the system 
of church-state relations in the Christian East as "caesaropapism." The 
term denotes "the rigid control of matters spiritual and ecclesiastical by 
the temporal ruler."20 Although the stereotype of a docile, politically apa­
thetic Orthodox Church still flourishes in the popular imagination, schol­
ars have for some time agreed that the concept of caesaropapism is 
f1awed. 21 The most obvious problem is that it construes Orthodoxy in 
Western terms by assuming that the Orthodox Church has a "pope" of 
some kind, that is to say, a central executive authority. Since the Orthodox 
Church does not possess such an authority yet has been closely linked to 
the state for most of its history, the political ruler was seen as "pope." That 
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the Christian church can avoid papalism without becoming Protestant 
was not considered. 
Another problem with the concept of caesaropapism is that it does not 
fit the facts of the church-state relationship in the Christian East, espe­
cially in the Byzantine period for which it was invented. While the Byz­
antine emperors, beginning with Emperor Constantine in the fourth 
century, were active and sometimes aggressive participants in the affairs 
of the church, relations between secular rulers and Orthodox bishops 
were often stormy, with many leading churchmen suffering deposition, 
exile, or worse in the defense of dogmatic and canonical positions that 
they deemed non-negotiable, Almost all of the great heresies of the 
patristic period-Arian, Monophysite, Monothelite, Iconoclast-enjoyed 
extensive imperial patronage, yet none of them prevailed in the long run. 
Even Justinian in the sixth century, who came closer than any Byzantine 
emperor to mastering the church, failed to achieve his most crucial ob­
jective in ecclesiastical affairs, which was the reconciliation of Ortho­
doxy and monophysitism.22 Justinian's interest in this issue was political 
and strategic. By his time monophysitism had become the majority view 
among the Christians of Syria and Egypt, and Justinian feared for the 
loyalty of these important Eastern provinces. The Islamic conquest a cen­
tury later proved the emperor's fears to be well founded, and it is cer­
tainly legitimate to wonder whether a more moderate stance in the 
monophysite controversy might not have served the Orthodox Church 
better than the one it took. What is not legitimate is to characterize the 
Byzantine church as a passive tool in the hands o[Justinian or any other 
caesar. On the issues it deemed crucial, the Orthodox Church followed 
its own lights. 
The concept that Orthodox thinkers have traditionally used to describe 
the right relationship between church and state is "harmony" (Greek sym­
phonia). The idea is that church and state are two parts of an ensemble 
whose conductor is Christ. The two entities are distinct, for without dis­
tinction there can be no harmony; but they complement and support each 
other in the larger whole, which is a godly Christian society. Justinian's 
epitome of the ideal in his sixth Novella is famous: 
'There are two greatest gifts which God, in his love for man, has granted 
from on high: the priesthood and the imperial dignity, The first serves di­
vine things, the second directs and administers human affairs; both, how­
ever, proceed from the same origin and adorn the life of mankind. Hence, 
nothing should be such a source of care to the emperors as the dignity of the 
priests, since it is for the welfare [of the empire] that they constantly implore 
12 4> Introduction to the Modem Orthodox Tradilion 
God. For if the priesthood is in every way free from blame and possesses ac­
cess to God, and if the emperors administer equitably and judiciously the 
state entrusted to their care, general harmony will result, and whatever is 
beneficial will be bestowed upon the human race.23 
The most striking feature of this ideal is the positive, theocentric view 
of the state: the state, like the church, receives its mandate directly from 
God. It is not subordinate to the church any more than the church is sub­
ordinate to the state. Church and state do not occupy higher and lower 
points in a great chain of being. Each is divinely gifted with its own being 
and vocation. The gifts are distinct, but the sacred body politic is one. The 
powerful theological paradigm of the Incarnation underlies this concep­
tion. "In the thought of Justinian, the 'symphony' between 'divine things' 
and 'human affairs' was based upon the Incarnation, which united the di­
vine and human natures, so that the person of Christ is the unique source 
of the two-the civil and ecclesiastical hierarchies."24 In a word, the state 
is as "Christic" as the church, albeit in a different sphere. 
Symphonia helps us appreciate many idioms of Orthodoxy. When Or­
thodox Christians honor certain rulers, such as Constantine the Great or 
Vladimir of Kiev, as "equals of the apostles" (isapostoloi), Western Chris­
tians tend to take offense. Secular rulers as apostles? Is this not caesaropap­
ism? Viewed in terms of symphonia, however, the usage makes more sense. 
When Prince Vladimir of Kiev made the decision to invite missionaries 
from Byzantium to evangelize and baptize his people, he was accomplish­
ing a divine mission, using the charisma of rulership bestowed upon him 
by God to cause the gospel to be preached in his heathen land. As the first 
of his princely line to exercise power in this way, Vladimir was "like" an 
apostle. His power was political and spiritual at the same time; his deci­
sion to invite the missionaries was a creative act, a fresh actualization of 
the spirit-guided charisma of right government. The "palladian" display of 
icons during sieges and military campaigns is another example of sym­
phonia. When General Kutuzov and his army prayed before an icon of the 
Mother of God in the field at Borodino in 1812, they were engaging in a 
public as well as a personal act, affirming the divine source of the state as 
well as of the church.25 
While appreciating the logic of symphonia. however, one must keep 
two facts in mind. First, symphonia was the ideal, not the reality, of 
church-state relations in the East. It was constantly proclaimed but sel­
dom realized. Second, conditions for the realization of the ideal, at least in 
its original sense, have not existed in the Orthodox world for some time. 
Symphonia assumes the existence of a Christian empire or at least a 
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Christian state. In fact, after the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, most 
Orthodox Christians except for the Russians lived in Muslim states. After 
1917 most Russians lived in an atheist state. Today, most Orthodox Chris­
tians live in secular states. Symphonia has become problematic in a way 
that cannot be mitigated by the banal observation that ideals always fall 
short in practice. 
To the extent that symphonia persists as an ideal in the Orthodox 
world-and the extent to which it persists demands investigation-the 
reason is probably the majority status of the Orthodox community in the 
populations of most of the post-Ottoman and post-Soviet successor states. 
The locus of symphonia has simply shifted from ruler to society. This fits 
in with the general democratization of political charisma in modern 
times: traditionally the prince or emperor was the "earthly god," in mod­
ern times the state or society assumes the role. Because the majority of 
the population in historic Orthodox countries still identifies with Ortho­
doxy at least nominally, it is possible to dream of effecting symphonia on 
the social and cultural, if not the political, plane. The Orthodox Church's 
claims to special status in postcommunist states are a reflection of this 
mentality, the expression of an ingrained sense of religious establish­
ment that has survived the political disestablishment of Orthodoxy26 In 
theological terms, of course, populist symphonia is suspect. Symphonia 
depends on charisma, and charisma is conferred on persons, not abstract 
entities. While it might be possible, given the logic of symphonia, to ap­
preciate evaluations of Constantine or Vladimir of Kiev as "equal of the 
apostles," it is a stretch to extend the honor to a society or nation. The 
emotional appeal of such theologized populism is nevertheless consider­
able in modern Orthodoxy. 
The political challenge for Orthodoxy in modern times is to find a reso­
nant alternative to symphonia as traditionally conceived. The thinkers 
represented in this volume all wrestled with this challenge in one way or 
another. Of the five, Vladimir Soloviev took the most traditional approach 
in that he continued to think in terms of an organic Christian society in 
which the disparate elements of spiritual, social, and political life are har­
moniously interconnected. As we shall see, Soloviev's way of conceiving 
symphonia was quite modern; nevertheless, he stood firmly in the historic 
tradition of Orthodox social and political thought. The fact that he still 
lived in an Orthodox empire had much to do with this. 
The neosymphonic approach was also adopted by most of the Russian 
Orthodox religious philosophers inspired by Soloviev, including Sergei 
Bulgakov.27 Nicholas Berdyaev was more radical, however. While inspired 
by Soloviev, Berdyaev was also a great admirer of nineteenth-century 
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Westerners such as Friedrich Nietzsche, S0ren Kierkegaard, and other 
fountainheads of the individualist and anarchist orientation that eventu­
ally came to be called existentialism. Berdyaev's "philosophy of freedom" 
left no room for organicism of any kind. Unlike many existentialists, how­
ever, Berdyaev remained loyal to the Solovievian tradition of social Chris­
tianity. Mother Maria Skobtsova, who was close to Bulgakov and Berdyaev, 
also promoted an Orthodox social gospel, and in the best possible way: by 
living it. 
Neopatristic thinkers broke with symphonia in an even more radical way 
than Berdyaev: they stopped looking for an Orthodox legal, social, and po­
litical doctrine. They did not address issues of law, society, and politics in 
any of their major works. In part this was a reaction to their special social 
and political circumstances, which have already been noted. But there was 
another factor. Lossky, Florovsky, and other first-generation neopatristic 
thinkers embraced a rigorously mystical and apophatic view of theology that 
effectively discouraged the theological interpretation of legal, social, and 
political questions.28 Mystical or apophatic theology is an effective means of 
contemplating the mystery of God as experienced in the depths of personaL 
being. It is not a useful tool for fashioning a theory of the state, evaluating a 
system of positive law, forging an interpretation of history, or other tasks 
normally involved in the construction of a social and political ethic. 
Not all theologians who contributed to the neopatristic movement 
were as radical as Florovsky and Lossky. Dumitru Staniloae, for example, 
was shaped by the Gandirea circle in Romania between the world wars, a 
religious-philosophical movement strongly resembling Russian Slavophil­
ism in its blending of Orthodoxy with national and cultural values. The ef­
fects can be detected in the more organic character of his theology.29 In 
the Communist era, of course, the search for Orthodox legal, social, and 
political thought came to a halt in Romania as it did elsewhere. Only in re­
cent years, with the emergence of free if struggling civil societies in the 
Christian East, has the search resumed, and it is too early to predict where 
it will lead. Orthodox nationalism, Christian socialism, neosymphonism, 
quietism, and some sort of accommodation between Orthodoxy and lib­
eralism are all possible outcomes. 
ORTHODOXY AND LAW 
The fourth-century Constantinian settlement that regularized the sta­
tus of the Christian church in the Roman Empire did not involve a legal 
revolution. On the contrary, the Roman legal system was a key element 
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of the new arrangement. To be sure, the system was incorporated into 
symphonia. But the law did not depend on symphonia. One might even 
argue that it was the other way around, since symphonia necessarily in­
volves an extra-ecclesiastical element: the imperial dignity as well as the 
priesthood, in Justinian's words. The Western medieval ideal of the su­
preme pontiff as the supreme lawgiver, or at least as the supreme arbiter 
of law in Christian society, was alien to Byzantium from the beginning. 
The emperor was the supreme lawgiver, a vocation conferred on him by 
God without priestly mediation and put into practice by his respect for 
the Roman legal tradition. When Eusebius of Caesarea, Constantine's 
apologist and the architect of symphonia, "developed the notion of a hu­
man viceroy dispensing Divine justice on earth in God's name,"30 he was 
Christianizing the Roman imperial office. But the justice the emperor 
dispensed was defined first of all by Roman law. Over time Christian 
ethical teachings had an impact on the law, especially in the areas of 
marriage, sexuality, inheritance, the treatment of women and children, 
capital punishment, and of course religion. Although significant, how­
ever, the impact fell short of bei ng revolutionary.31 Some of the differences 
between Orthodox and Catholic ethical norms, such as the Orthodox 
Church's toleration of divorce, are traceable to the fact that for a thousand 
years the Orthodox Church had to accommodate itself to the preexisting 
Roman legal system. The Western church had a freer hand to legislate as it 
saw fit because of the fifth-century collapse of imperial authority in the 
West. 
The Orthodox Church's legal competence widened in the twilight cen­
turies of Byzantium (1204-1453), initiating a metamorphosis that was 
completed in the Ottoman period when the sultan recognized the Ortho­
dox Church as the judicial authority over his Christian subjects. Roman 
law still figured in the system to the extent that bits and pieces of it had 
long been incorporated into the "nomocanons" which guided the Church 
in matters of civil and ecclesiastical law. Nomocanons were concise refer­
ence works assembled in the Byzantine period to facilitate the judicial 
tasks of bishops and the ecclesiastical dealings of imperial bureaucrats. 
The distinctive feature of the books was the conflation of ecclesiastical 
and imperial legislation. Imperial laws (nomoi) and church canons dealing 
with related issues appeared side by side, carrying equal weight and sup­
posedly harmonizing with each other. The continued use of such instru­
ments by the Orthodox Church during the Turkish period was a powerful 
statement of loyalty to the Byzantine heritage, but it did not and could not 
replicate the Byzantine legal order. In Byzantium, law was crafted by the 
imperial authority, not by the church; and the study oflaw flourished as an 
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independent discipline with its own specialists and schools. All of this 
passed away with the collapse of the empire. The system patronized by the 
Turks may be called an ecclesiocracy. It left no room for an autonomous 
legal order. 
The influence of Roman law in the Slavic lands converted to Ortho­
doxy during the Byzantine period is a complicated question. 32 Nomocan­
ons were part of the cultural and ecclesiastical legacy transmitted to the 
converts. In Slavonic translation, these "pilot books"- kormchie knigi, as 
they were called-had an impact on the legislative monuments with 
which medieval Slavic princes occasionally adorned their "little Byzan­
tiums."33 But as has often been noted, the Byzantines were selective in 
what they shared with the "barbarians." They focused on religion rather 
than culture, on Christianization rather than Hellenization. The mis­
sionary strategy of evangelizing the Slavs in their own language rather 
than the imperial language reinforced this selectivity by withholding the 
tool that would have given the Slavs direct access to the Byzantine cul­
tural tradition. Roman legal science was not transmitted to the Slavs any 
more than classical Greek poetry was. Even if it had been, the effects 
would have been minimized by the Mongol conquest of Russia and the 
Ottoman conquest of the South Slavs in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. By the time the Russians regained their independence and be­
gan building a great Orthodox empire in the north, Byzantium was no 
more. The Russians fashioned their polity from a variety of sources in­
cluding nomocanons, Slavic customary law, and Mongol administrative 
practices. The state that emerged was emphatically Orthodox, and its 
ruler proudly claimed the Byzantine imperial titles of tsar (caesar) and 
autocrat. But Russian Byzantinism was one-sided: it replicated Roman 
autocracy without Roman law. The political reforms of Peter the Great 
did nothing to correct this deficiency.34 
Orthodox canon law survived the fall of Byzantium, of course, and 
shaped personal life and civil society both in Muscovy and in the ecclesio­
cratic system of the Ottoman Empire.35 But Orthodox canon law was a con­
servative discipline. It did not stimulate jurisprudence as the study of 
Roman Catholic canon law did in the West. The dynamism of Roman Cath­
olic canon law depended on two conditions that did not exist in the East: a 
complex ("feudal") web of competing secular and ecclesiastical jurisdic­
tions requiring regulation, and the existence of a supreme legislator in the 
church, namely the Pope of Rome, whose decrees were a constant source of 
new law ("reform") for the church. Like the Protestants of a later age, the 
Orthodox regarded the growth of law in the Western church as a hypertro­
phy, a violation of the spirit of the gospel. But Protestant and Orthodox crit-
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icisms of Roman legalism were differently motivated. The Protestants were 
interested in reforming the church, a concept for which they were ironically 
indebted to the authority structure against which they rebelled, namely, the 
reforming papacy of the Middle Ages. The Orthodox rejected papalism on 
grounds of tradition, a standard quite different from reform. 
The traditional character of Orthodox canon law is reflected in the orga­
nization of the canonical collections and in the fact that one must speak of 
collections in the plural. The Orthodox Church does not possess a "Code of 
Canon Law."36 It preserves a number of esteemed collections and commen­
taries, some medieval, some more recent. The drive to forge a "Concordance 
of Discordant Canons," as Gratian did around 1140 for medieval Catholi­
cism, never caught on in Orthodoxy, probably because of the recognition 
that such an enterprise would end up making new laws, hence in some 
sense "reforming" the church. Orthodox canonists do not relish such a 
prospect, preferring to regard themselves as faithful transmitters of that 
which they have received from the ancients. The outlook is reflected in the 
tripartite organization of Orthodox canonical collections: apostolic canons 
come first, the canons of the ecumenical councils and other important syn­
ods stand next, and selected chapters from the writings of the church fathers 
round out the collection. Apostles, councils, and fathers-in that order-are 
treasured as prototypes of the unbroken practice of the church, not as raw 
material to be manipulated by legal rationality. 
The strength of the Orthodox approach to canon law is the sense of lim­
its brought to the subject by respect for tradition, in spiritual terms a kind 
of humility. Orthodoxy, like other forms of Christianity, has had its share 
of power-hungry prelates, but they have not found it easy to use canon law 
to justify their rapaciousness. The dictatorial legalism of the Roman pa­
pacy at its worst is absent from Orthodoxy. Unfortunately, another kind of 
legalism has not been absent: that which springs from an exaggerated and 
exceSSively literal dependence on the past, "the tendency to freeze his­
tory," as Meyendorff has characterized it. 37 One might call it paleocracy. 
Modern Orthodox theologians attempt to mitigate this type of legalism 
by distinguishing between tradition and traditions, that is to say, between 
the inalterable essentials of Orthodoxy and the many historically relative 
customs that not only can but in some circumstances must be changed in 
order to preserve the core values of tradition. The distinction is an impor­
tant one, but it is not itself traditional, at least not in its strong form. An 
invention of modern theologians beginning with John Henry Newman, 
the distinction would have seemed strange to Orthodox churchmen of an 
earlier age. The history of Orthodoxy is full of conflicts over small points 
of practice that were deemed inalterable because they were traditional. 
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The most tragic case was the Russian Orthodox schism of the seven­
teenth century, when Old Believers separated from the Patriarchal church 
as a result of minute changes in prayer books and ritual practices. The de­
fection probably commanded the loyalty, active or tacit, of the majority 
of Russian Orthodox Christians at the time. There are many other exam­
ples. A bitter dispute over the appropriate day (Saturday or Sunday) for 
memorial services for the departed embroiled the Greek church for many 
decades in the eighteenth century. In our day, Old Calendrists and New 
Calendrists battle each other in many Orthodox jurisdictions. If disputes 
of this kind were the work of an obscurantist fringe, as is sometimes 
thought, they could be ignored. In fact, they reflect the power of the pa­
leocratic mentality in Orthodoxy. When Russian Orthodox Old Believers 
accepted torture and death rather than change (for example) the number 
of fingers they used to make the sign of the cross, they were not manifest­
ing willful hearts as their detractors charged. They were abiding by a pat­
tern which they honestly believed to be apostolic-and reasonably so, in 
that the apostles and saints were shown crossing themselves in just such 
a way on the icons that festooned their churches, images that were re­
garded as absolutely faithful copies of their prototypes. 
The same attitude sometimes appears in learned theology. When one of 
the greatest Orthodox canonists of modern times, Nikodemos of the Holy 
Mountain (1749-1809), in his celebrated collection and commentary 
known as the PedaLion (The Pilot), emphatically defended the authenticity 
of all eighty-five Apostolic Canons against the Roman Catholic count of 
fifty-an old dispute-he was doing more than excoriating "Latin here­
tics." As he saw it, he was standing up for the actual practice of the apos­
tles of Christ. That the Apostolic Canons is a fourth or fifth century 
composition, that the Roman count also dates from antiquity, and that 
even some Byzantine authorities doubted whether the Apostolic Canons 
issued from the hands of the apostles-these considerations were trumped 
by the force of a long-standing tradition. The eighty-five Apostolic Canons 
appeared in all Orthodox collections of canons since formal compendia 
began to be made in Byzantium in the ninth century. It was inconceivable 
to Nikodemos that the tradition of the church in this matter could be any­
thing other than what it claimed to be, namely, apostoIic. 38 
The Orthodox canonicaL tradition did not always lead the church to de­
fend the status quo. In some historical contexts, appeal to the canons had 
reformist implications, especially where the Orthodox Church was forced 
by an oppressive political regime to violate its canonical structure. In 
these situations the appeal to restore canonical order was in effect a de­
mand for political reform and greater latitude for civil society. 
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Orthodox resistance to the Petrine ecclesiastical settlement in the 
Russian Empire had this character. In his zeal to make Russia a European 
power, Peter the Great reconstructed the Muscovite polity along the 
lines of Western European absolutism. In the process he imposed a radi­
cally untraditional constitution on the Russian Orthodox Church. 39 The 
patriarchate of Moscow and the conciliar institutions of the church were 
suspended and replaced by a small synod of bishops chaired by a lay bu­
reaucrat, or oberprocurator, responsible solely to the emperor. Every as­
pect of church life was brought under government supervision. Even the 
sanctity of confession was violated as priests were charged with certain 
police functions. The bishops of the Holy Synod were not at liberty to as­
semble without the permission of the oberprocurator. The episcopate as 
a whole never assembled, not once during the entire synodal period 
(1721-1917). 
There was much dissatisfaction with this patently uncanonical system 
of church government among learned Russian Orthodox, although state 
censorship limited public expression of dissent. Unfortunately, no one 
ever found a way to change the system from within. The Great Reforms of 
the 1860s, which abolished serfdom, created a modern judicial system, put 
a system of local government in place, and reformed the army, ignored the 
church. A promising conciliar movement in 1905-1906 enjoyed wide­
spread support but failed to convene a council because the tsar's govern­
ment withheld permission:~() The council did not assemble until 1917, after 
the imperial regime had fallen and the Bolsheviks were literally at the 
door. The Local Council of 1917 restored the patriarchate and cast off the 
other oppressive features of the synodal regime, but its resolutions soon 
became moot as the young Soviet regime set about forcibly dismantling 
the Orthodox Church. 
Following World War II, when the Soviet government allowed the Or­
thodox Church to reconstitute itself within strict limits and under state 
supervision, the appeal to canonical order again emerged as a vehicle for 
dissent. Soviet laws on religion had suppressed almost all of the canonical 
structures that protect the autonomy of the church, such as conciliar gov­
ernment and the clerical preSidency of parish councils. The criticism of 
this legislation was the point of the celebrated letters to the patriarch and 
the Soviet president by Fathers Eshliman and Yakunin in 1965, one of the 
opening salvos of the Soviet human rights movement.41 Meanwhile the 
quiet but forceful example of Father Aleksandr Men, a Moscow priest 
with a gift for ministry to intellectuals, showed that a profound Orthodox 
ministry to society was possible (if rare) in spite of the suppression of ca­
nonical order by the Soviet regime.42 Canonical order was restored by the 
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glasnost-era Council of 1988, two years before Soviet legislation on reli­
gion was officially changed. 
Of course, some disturbances of canonical order come from within the 
church. A contemporary example is the "canonical chaos" that obtains in 
the Orthodox diaspora.43 Nothing is more basic to canonical order in Or­
thodoxy than the unity of the local church: one city, one bishop, one 
church. Yet nothing is more characteristic of the Orthodox diaspora than 
the maze of overlapping and competing ecclesiastical jurisdictions operat­
ing in the same space. In most places this antisystem is the result of the 
movement of populations in modern times. Relocated ethnic groups wish 
to maintain their ties with the mother church and introduce its hierarchy 
abroad. Understandable as these loyalties are, their effect has been to un­
dercut the unity and mission of Orthodoxy. In America, for example, most 
non-Orthodox regard the various Orthodox bodies as completely different 
churches. The extent to which these bodies agree on doctrine, liturgy, and 
discipline is rarely appreciated. Divisions of a more serious kind, springing 
from internecine conflict, are also a problem. In Estonia, Ukraine, and 
elsewhere, bitter divisions and jurisdictional disputes bedevil the life of the 
church. 
What makes these internal lapses of canonical order especially de­
moralizing is that the Orthodox Church today has the freedom to cor­
rect them but, so far, cannot seem to do so. Aside from vested interests, 
the problem is the absence of central authority. Interjurisdictional coor­
dination is difficult in Orthodoxy because no one in particular is re­
sponsible for it. Not even the Ecumenical Patriarch (the Patriarch of 
Constantinople) has this authority; indeed, he is often one of the parties 
in need of coordination. The national and regional churches that consti­
tute the Orthodox communion are "autocephalous," that is to say, ad­
ministratively and judicially independent of each other. The unity of 
Orthodoxy is expressed through fidelity to a common tradition and in 
conciliar gatherings. When Orthodox bishops come into conflict with 
each other, only a council can restore order. In the case of conflicts be­
tween autocephalous churches, this means a worldwide or general coun­
cil. But there is a problem here: for all its famed sobornost, the Orthodox 
Church has not actually held a worldwide council since the year 787-not 
exactly a recent precedent. In effect, worldwide Orthodoxy finds itself in 
the situation that the Roman Catholic Church would be in if, while pro­
fessing the ideal of a papal monarchy, it lacked an actual papacy. 
The gap between the theory and practice of sobornost is a manifestation 
of a general problem in the Orthodox canonical tradition, namely, the ten-
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dency to cherish mystically authenticated concepts without doing much 
to effectuate them. The distinguished Orthodox canonist John Erickson 
has written of the need "to rediscover the implications of communion for 
community. lest our much-vaunted [Orthodox] 'spirituality' and 'mystical 
theology' degenerate into dilettantish escapism:~1 His plea, delivered in 
1982, is as relevant as ever today. 
ORTHODOXY AND DEMOCRACY 
The overarching challenge for Orthodox thought on law, politics, and so­
ciety in the twenty-first century is to clarify the role the church should 
play in the construction of a democratic civil society. The church has a 
huge stake in the matter. No responsible party wishes to repeat the catas­
trophes of the Communist era, and most Orthodox leaders today recog­
nize that a stable democratic order is the surest safeguard against doing 
so. The situation is nevertheless unprecedented. The large majority of Or­
thodox have little if any experience of democracy. Moreover, like other 
churches that relied on state establishment, the Orthodox Church has 
inherited a low degree of popular participation in its institutions and 
programs. In The Russian Question at the End oj the Twentieth Century, 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn lamented "our ingrained and wretched Russian 
tradition: we refuse to learn how to organizefrom below, and are inclined 
to wait for instructions from a monarch. a leader, a spiritual or political 
authority.''45 This is not just a Russian question. It applies to state and 
church in most parts of the Orthodox world today. 
The Orthodox thinkers treated in this volume offer various resources 
on the issue of Orthodoxy and democracy without providing anything 
. like a blueprint of the solution, The latter is too much to expect, given the 
enormous changes that have taken place in the social and political cir­
cumstances of Orthodoxy in recent years. The gap between the world that 
our five Orthodox thinkers knew and the present situation of their faith 
tradition is greater than in the case of the Protestant or Roman Catholic 
figures treated in the companion volumes. Of the five, the one who 
thought the most systematically about the role ofOrthodoxy in civil soci­
ety is the farthest removed from us in time: Vladimir Soloviev. The appar­
ent irony is dispelled when one considers that Soloviev was the only one of 
the five who completely predated the Communist upheaval. A modern­
style civil society was emerging in Russia in Soloviev's day, however un­
evenly, and his social and political philosophy contributed to it. 
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The other Orthodox thinkers presented here endured the political trau­
mas of twentieth-century Europe in one way or another, including the 
lengthy political imprisonment suffered by Dumitru Staniloae and mar­
tyrdom in a Nazi death camp in the case of Mother Maria Skobtsova. Yet 
there is a brighter side to the picture in that Berdyaev, Lossky, an9. Mother 
Maria also experienced democracy by virtue of their many years of resi­
dence in France. During their lifetimes, they did not have the opportunity 
to share their experience with those living on historically Orthodox soil, 
but their example has fresh relevance for their coreligionists who wrestle 
with the issue of Orthodoxy and democracy today. 
There is evidence that contemporary Orthodox leaders recognize the 
need for greater attention to problems of law, society, and politics in the 
postcommunist environment. A good example is the detailed outline of 
Christian social teachings, "Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian 
Orthodox Church," that the episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church 
(Moscow Patriarchate) adopted at a council in 2000.46 The document con­
tains specific teachings on topics as various as church-state relations, Or­
thodoxy and secular law, economic justice, criminal law, bioethics, 
environmental ethics, sexual ethics, religion and science, and international 
relations. The 12s-page compendium represents a striking innovation in 
Orthodox practice, bearing greater resemblance to a papal encyclical or a 
report by a national Roman Catholic bishops' conference than to any tradi­
tional Orthodox form of expression. Some of the positions incorporated in 
it, such as the theological defense of civil disobedience in certain circum­
stances, are virtually unprecedented in Orthodox legal, social, and politi­
cal thought. 
The cultivation of sobornost also bears on the practice of Orthodoxy in 
a democracy. To be sure, a church council is not a democratic assembly. 
Yet it is an assembly, and the virtues and skills that sustain it are trans­
ferable. These include the practice of shared responsibility, an under­
standing of due process, techniques of discussion, debate, and decision 
making, and above all the experience of participating in decisions about 
matters that affect one's life. For this reason one may claim that conciliar 
practice and democracy, though not the same thing, can reinforce and 
enrich each other. This connection also works in the negative: oligarchy 
in the state and oligarchy in the church reinforce each other. 
The issue of initiative and participation pertains to other sectors of 
Orthodox church life besides councils, such as liturgy and parish life. 
The great liturgies of the Christian East are the glory of Orthodoxy, but 
as currently practiced in most parts of the Orthodox world they discour­
age broad participation in worship. Liturgical reforms are needed to ad-
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dress this problem, but few churchmen are willing to touch the issue 
because of the explosive potential of Orthodox legalism. Priests who 
have experimented with new forms have been marginalized and some­
times vilified. Although fears that reform could land Orthodoxy in a 
state of liturgical confusion comparable to that of post-Vatican II Ca­
tholicism are by no means groundless, criticism of Western pathologies 
cannot compensate for absence of renewal in the East. As for the Ortho­
dox parish, its renewal is closely connected with liturgical reform. There 
are other challenges as welL such as the need for a theology of the laity 
in OrthodoxyY 
Admittedly, one should not abuse the theme of Orthodoxy and de­
mocracy by implying that the primary vocation of the Orthodox Church 
is to build democracy. For the sake of its distinctive mission, the church 
must keep its distance from the powers of this world, including the dem­
ocratic powers of this world. The distance is healthy not just for the 
church but for the democratic state because it keeps prophetically open 
the issue of how the Christian love-ethic relates to the ethics of democ­
racy. This profound question has not yet been adequately clarified any­
where. Democracy is still a relatively new phenomenon in world history, 
and neither its grandeur nor its pitfalls have been sufficiently probed. 
The transcendent love which Orthodoxy serves-the "acosmic love" that 
so impressed Max Weber in the heroes of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy48­
has not figured conspicuously in the ethics of democracy. Yet Orthodox 
Christians are clearly called to witness to this "more excellent way" (1 
Cor. 12:31). 
And witnesses there have been. Surely the most enduring legacy of 
twentieth-century Orthodoxy will be the veneration of the martyrs and 
confessors who suffered for their faith at the hands of the Communist 
state-a state, let it be remembered, that called itself "social-democratic." 
No discussion of justice, law, and society in modern Christianity can pass 
over this historical record in silence. A life-giving resource for the church, 
the blood of the new martyrs is a thundering stream of judgment on the 
powers of the modern world, including the democratic powers. It will not 
do to object that Communism was not "true" democracy. Of course it was 
not; but neither was it unconnected with modern democratic ideas. The 
ethicist will do better to follow Reinhold Niebuhr at this point and recog­
nize the threat of the demonic in all social and political ideologies. 
As the Orthodox churches that suffered under Communism investigate 
the historical record, a new martyrology is emerging. The process is most 
advanced in the Russian Orthodox Church. At the Council of 2000, no 
fewer than 1,149 new Russian saints were canonized, most of them martyrs 
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of the Communist period. The number alone is an indication ofhow long it 
will take to assimilate the meaning of what happened to the Orthodox 
Church in the twentieth century. 
The report of the investigative commission that recommended the 
canonizations to the Council of 2000 is a document without much rhe­
torical embellishment, and therein lies its eloquence.49 The record speaks 
for itself. 111e "throng" (sonm) of the martyred embraces all canonical 
stations of the church: metropolitan bishops, archbishops, bishops, ar­
chimandrites, archpriests, hegumens, priests (the largest group), hiero­
monks, protodeacons, deacons, monks and nuns, novices, and laypersons. 
Presented by diocese and distinguished by canonical rank, the martyrs 
are listed alphabetically by their first name, a reminder of the ultimate 
significance of the individual person-and of personal responsibility-in 
the kingdom of God. Also included among the canonized are forty-six 
individuals who are "not yet revealed to the world by name, but known to 
God." 
The council also resolved "to canonize as paSSion-bearers, in the throng 
of new martyrs and confessors of Russia, the Imperial Family: Emperor 
Nicholas II, Empress Aleksandra, the Tsarevich Aleksy, and the grand 
princesses Olga, Tatiana, Maria, and Anastasia." "Passion-bearers" (stras­
toterptsy) is a term traditionally applied to princes who manifested Chris­
tian virtues while suffering at the hands of their political enemies. But the 
princely connection was less important to the authors of the report than 
the national connec tion: "111fough the sufferings of the Imperial Family 
in their captivity, borne with meekness, patience and humility, and in 
their martyr's death in Yekaterinburg on the night of July 4 (17), 1918, the 
light of the faith of Christ which overcomes evil was made manifest, just 
as it shone in the life and death of the millions of Orthodox Christians 
who endured persecution for Christ in the twentieth century." 
In time, the annals of the new martyrs will become part of the sacred 
story of every diocese in Orthodoxy. Icons of the new saints have been 
prepared, and more will follow. The cloud of witnesses to a more excellent 
way will shine as a perpetual reminder of the glory of the kingdom of God 
and the limits of all earthly polities. 
Yet the critique of democracy, important as it is, cannot be the first or­
der of business in twenty-first century Orthodoxy. More important for 
the church's present welfare is the task of measuring up to the challenges 
facing it in a democratic society, including the need for a more positive 
understanding of law. In rising to this occasion, Orthodoxy will discover 
more about itself than it has known before and more about the gospel 
than it has known before. A new challenge is at hand. In the Communist 
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era Orthodox Christians died for their faith. In the world after Commu­
nism they must learn to live for it. 
NOTES 
1.	 J. M. Hussey, The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire (Oxford: Claren­
don Press, 1986), I. 
2.	 The insights of Edward Said's concept of "oriental ism" have long been assimi­
lated by scholars of Islam and non-Western religions. The concept is also rele­
vant to the study of Orthodox Christianity, although this has rarely been 
recognized. 
3.	 The branch of theology concerned with the writings of the "fathers" of the an­
cient and medieval church is usually called patristics. The fathers did not oc­
cupy anyone station or office in the church. Some were bishops, some 
presbyters (priests), some monks, some scholars. Because they were male, the 
discipline devoted to studying their writings is accurately named. However, 
inasmuch as the role of women in the ancient church was enormous, albeit 
traditionally ignored, the pursuit of"matristics" is sure to grow in the coming 
years and provide a corrective to one-sided attention to the fathers. 
The major languages of patristic literature are Greek, Latin, and Syriac. 
The literature falls into three historical periods: the early period, when Chris­
tianity was a persecuted faith (first to early fou rth centuries); the classical pe­
riod, when Christianity became the established religion of the Roman Empire 
and codified its fundamental doctrines at the first ecumenical councils (fourth 
through sixth centuries); and the medieval period, when the Greek-speaking 
(Byzantine) East and the Latin-speaking West gradually uncoupled (seventh 
through fifteenth centuries). Before the twentieth century, Western patristic 
scholarship focused almost exclusively on the first two periods, ignoring Byz­
antine (but not medieval Latin) theology. Since the early twentieth century. 
Byzantine theology has received attention. Some of its greatest minds~ 
Maximus the Confessor (ca. 580-662), Symeon the New Theologian (949-1022), 
and Gregory Palamas (1296-1359). among others-have begun to be appreCi­
ated beyond the boundaries of Orthodoxy and have also become much better 
known in the Orthodox world. In general it is fair to say that interest in the 
Greek and Syrian fathers of all three patristic periods is growing steadily. The 
early Byzantine theologians Gregory of Nazianzus (Gregory the Theologian, 
ca. 329-390), Basil of Caesarea (Basil the Great. 330-379), and Gregory of 
Nyssa (331/40-ca. 395)-called the Cappadocians after the name of their na­
tive province in Asia Minor-are especially prominent reference points in 
contemporary theological discussions. 
The standard handbook to patristic literature of the early and classical pe­
riods is Johannes Quasten, Patro{ogy, 4 vols. (Westminster, Md.: Christian 
Classics, 1990). Another useful tool is Dictionary ofEarly Christian Literature. 
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ed. Siegmar Dopp and Wilhelm Geerlings, trans. Matthew O'Connell (New 
York: Crossroad, 2000). For a survey of early patristic theology by a contem­
porary Orthodox scholar, see John Behr, The Way to Nicaea: The Formation 
ofChristian Trleology, voJ. 1 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 
2001). A magnificent introduction to the world of the Cappadocians is 
provided by John McGuckin, Saint Gregory of Nazianzus: An Intellectual 
Biography (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001). 1he best 
introduction to Byzantine theology in English is John Meyendorff, Byzan­
tine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Trlemes (New York: Ford­
ham University Press, 1974). Good monographs also exist on individual 
theologians: for example, Aidan Nichols, Byzantine Gospel: Maximus the 
Confessor in Modern Scholarship (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993); John Mey­
endorff, A Study ofGregory Palamas, tra ns. George Lawrence, 2d ed. (Crest­
wood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974); and Hilarion Alfeyev, St. 
Symeon the New Trleologian and Orthodox Tradition (Oxford: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 2000). 
Some of the most readable English-language editions of patristic writings 
are found in the Paulist Press series "Classics of Western Spirituality," which 
includes a fair sampling of Eastern Christian works. ("Western" in the series 
title refers collectively to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions, not to 
Western as opposed to Eastern Christianity.) Standard collections of the fa­
thers in English include two continuing series, "Ancient Christian Writers: 
1he Works of the Fathers in Translation," now published by the Catholic Uni­
versity of America Press, and "TIle Fathers of the Church: A New Translation," 
now published by the Paulist Press. Still useful, although extremely anti­
quated, are two nineteenth-century collections: The Ante-Nicene Fathers: 
Translations of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, ed. Alexander Roberts and 
James Donaldson, 10 vols., and A Select Library ofthe Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, 28 vols., 
repr. ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1978-79). 
4.	 Lossky's book had a considerable impact in the English-speaking world thanks 
to a relatively early translation: Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Iheology ofthe 
Eastern Church (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1957). Florovsky's long and diffi­
cult book was translated much later: Georges Florovsky, The Ways ofRussian 
Trleology, part 1, trans. Robert L. Nichols, The Collected Works ofGeorges Flo­
roYsky, voJ. 5 (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1979); part 2, The Collected Works of 
George Florovsky, vol. 6 (Vaduz, Liechtenstein: Buchervertriebsanstalt, 1987). 
The best introduction to Florovsky's thought is not The Ways ofRussian Trw­
ology but the elegant, pithy essays on a wide variety of patristic topiCS in The 
Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, t4 vols. (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 
1972-89)· 
5.	 TIle pioneering work in Orthodox ethics by Stanley Harakas, Vigen Gur­
oian, and other American scholars is not primarily neopatristic in inspira­
tion. It owes more to the sustained dialogue between creative Orthodox 
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ethicists and the interconfessional discipline of Christian ethics as prac­
ticed in North America. The Greek theologian Christos Yannaras comes 
closer to being an ethicist of neopatristic inspiration. See his The Freedom 
of Morality, trans. Elizabeth Briere with a foreword by Bishop Kallistos of 
Diokleia (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984). For a fine 
example of the American contribution, see Vigen Guroian, Incarnate Love: 
Essays in Orthodox Ethics. 2d ed. (Notre Dame. Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press. 2002). 
6.	 "Actually. one can hardly find. in the entire religious literature of Byzantium, 
any systematic treatment of Christian ethics, or behavior, but rather innumer­
able examples of moral exegesis of Scripture, and ascetical treatises on prayer 
and spirituality. TIlis implies that Byzantine ethics were eminently 'theologi­
cal ethics.' The basic affirmation that every man, whether Christian or not, is 
created according to the image of God and therefore called to divine commu­
nion and 'deification,' was of course recognized, but no attempt was ever made 
to build 'secular' ethics for man 'in general.''' Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology. 
226. 
7.	 Kallistos Ware, "Eastern Christianity:' The Encyclopedia ofReligion, ed. Mir­
cea Eliade (New York: Free Press, 1987), 4:571. 
8.	 Leonardo Boff, Trinity and SOCiety, trans. Paul Burns (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis 
Books. 1988). 
9.	 Michael Aksionov Meerson's The Trinity ofLove in Modern Russian Theology: 
The Love Paradigm and the Retrieval of '\rfestern Medieval Love Mysticism in 
Modern Russian Trinitarian Thought (from Solovyov to Bulgakov) (Quincy. 
lll.: Franciscan Press, 1998) is an important contribution to a widened trinitar­
ianism in Orthodox theology. Although this book has ethical implications. it 
is not primarily an essay in ethics; neither can the author be called a neopa­
tristic theologian. 
10.	 Makarios and Nikodemos's work is available in English: The Philokalia: The 
Complete Text, compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St. 
Makarios of Corinth, trans. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard and Kallistos 
Ware, 3 vols. (London: Faber and Faber. 1979-84). Dumitru Staniloae pro­
duced a twelve-volume Romanian Philokalia (1946-91). See chapter 5, this 
volume. 
11.	 "TIle view of man prevailing in the Christian East is based upon the notion of 
'participation' in God. Man has been created not as an autonomous or self-suf­
ficient being; his very nature is truly itself only inasmuch as it exists 'in God' 
or 'in grace.' Grace, therefore, gives man his 'natural' development. This basic 
presupposition explains why the terms 'nature' and 'grace: when used by Byz­
antine authors, have a meaning quite different from the Western usage; rather 
than being in direct opposition. the terms 'nature' and 'grace' express a dy­
namic. living, and necessary relationship between God and man, different by 
their natures, but in communion with each other through God's energy, or 
grace." Meyendorff; Byzantine Theology, 138. 
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12.	 The first two uses are the civil use of the law as a means of preserving public 
order and the theological use of the law as a means of convicting sinners of 
unrighteousness, thereby awakening in them a hunger for redemption. 
13·	 The best introduction to Slavophilism is Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile 
Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Rus­
sian Thought, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Notre Dame, Ind.: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1989). The best collection of Slavophile writings in En­
glish is On Spiritual Unity: A Slavophile Reader, trans. and ed. Boris Jakim 
and Robert Bird (Hudson, N.Y.: Lindisfarne Books, 1998). 
14.	 Sobornost comes from the Slavic root meaning "gather." So, for example, the 
noun sobor means "church council" and also "cathedral" (where the people 
gather for liturgy). The adjective sobornyi translates "catholic" in the Nicene 
Creed: "one holy, catholic and apostolic Church." Community, fellowship, 
conciliarity, catholicity, cathedral-feeling-all these meanings resound in the 
term sobornost. In recent decades the word has begun an international career, 
appearing, for example, in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(1981). 
15.	 Andrzej Walicki, LegaL Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (Oxford: Claren­
don Press, 1987),9-104. 
16.	 For a fine discussion, see Harold J. Berman, "The Weightier Matters of the 
Law: A Response to Solzhenitsyn," in Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of 
Law and Religion (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1993), 381-392. 
17.	 On the liberalism of Soloviev and some of the thinkers inspired by him, see 
Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism; and the classic Russian 
work of 1902, Problems of Idealism: Essays in Russian Social Philosophy, 
trans. and ed. Randall A. Poole (New Haven. Conn.: Yale University Press, 
2003). 
18.	 See note 3 above. 
19.	 Sergei Horuzhy, a mathematical physicist, has elaborated a philosophy of 
"energetism" based, as he claims, on hesychasm. See Sergei Khoruzhii, J( 
fenomenologii askezy (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo gumanitarnoi literatury. 1998) 
and 0 starom i 0 novom (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000). For a related essay 
in English see Sergei S. Horuzhy. "Neo-Patristic Synthesis and Russian Phi­
losophy;' St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 44 (2000): 309-328. 
20.	 John W. Barker,Justinian and the Later Roman Empire (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1966),97. 
21.	 The essential essay on the subject is Deno J. Geanakoplos, "Church and State 
in the Byzantine Empire: A Reconsideration of the Problem of Caesaropap­
ism." in id., Byzantine East and Latin West: Two Worlds of Christendom in 
Middle Ages and Renaissance, Studies in Ecclesiastica~ and Cultural History 
(New York: Harper & Row. 1966), 55-83. 
22.	 Monophysitism, literally "one-nature-ism," is the view that humanity and di­
vinity were so integrally united in Christ that one may speak of "one incarnate 
nature of God the Word." The Orthodox doctrine, confirmed at the Council of 
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